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Abstract Citizens are strongly interested not to suffer from the damages wrought by
inflation. With the development of inconvertible fiat paper money and the creation of
the monopoly of central banks to issue unlimited amounts of banknotes the restrictions
formerly existing because of the convertibility of notes into gold or silver at a fixed
parity have been removed. As a consequence a constitutional or legal limitation of the
supply of money became necessary to check the inflationary bias of politicians became
necessary. This could be reached by introducing the independence of central banks
from political and governmental influence as a fourth pillar of the separation of
powers. The paper also discusses under which conditions monetary stability and
independence of central banks can develop and under which it is threatened.
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1 Introduction
The separation of powers is besides federalism and direct democracy one of the
bulwarks against the concentration of power and thus its misuse by government
against the freedom and interests of the population. As James Madison expressed it
in The Federalist No.47:
The accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive and judiciary, in the
same hands, whether of one, a few, or many, and whether hereditary, self-
appointed, or elective, may justly be pronounced the very definition of
tyranny. (The Federalist, p. 313)
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Long-term price stability is one of the most important concerns of the population.
As will be shown below, this stability has for centuries been assisted by the fact that
the coins used for payment were minted from precious metals like gold or silver.
After the invention and introduction of banknotes stability was maintained by a
legally guaranteed obligation to exchange the notes at the demand of holders any
time at a fixed parity into gold or silver. This situation ended when this
convertibility was abolished and a monopoly to issue banknotes granted by
governments to central banks. Since then these banks are technically able to produce
as many notes as they or the governments controlling them wanted. Given the bias
of politicians in favor of inflation demonstrated below, only an independence of
central banks from the political system seems to be adequate to limit inflation in the
long run. This means that the independence of central banks should constitute an
important fourth pillar in the separation of powers, a postulate until now neglected
in the literature. Therefore the independence from national administrations by
international treaty (as for the European Central Bank, ECB), the constitution (in
Switzerland), or law (in the USA), establishing them as a fourth pillar of the
separation of powers is important for relative price stability, given the inconvert-
ibility of paper money and the absence of budget constraints for central banks.
Independent Central Banks are a relatively new component of the separation of
powers. As legally independent institutions within nation states they mostly
emerged after the 2nd World War. But Montague Norman, governor of the Bank of
England since 1920, asked for the independence of central banks from governments
already in a manifesto which he circulated in 1921 among interested parties. And it
is remarkable that the independence of the central banks of Austria, Germany,
Hungary and Poland was already established between 1922 and 1924 as one of the
measures taken to end hyperinflation in these countries. On the other hand, in all
these cases independence was later removed by authoritarian regimes in the wake of
the Great Depression and because of war preparations. This early reversal poses the
question whether a separation of powers is at all possible in authoritarian regimes.
We will return to this problem later when discussing reasons for the weakening or
abolishment of the independence of central banks.
But before doing so it has first to be examined, when, why and under which
conditions central banks emerged. Secondly it has to be discussed what is meant by
the independence of them. Third, as shown above, it has to be asked under which
conditions the independence of central banks became an economic and a political
issue and led to its formal legal introduction. This development towards
independent central banks is the more surprising since it can be shown that rulers,
politicians and governments have historically always been inclined to enjoy a free
hand in monopolizing and manipulating money and currency. Finally, it will be
examined under which conditions the independence of central banks is threatened,
mitigated or abolished.
Central banks have first emerged—like the Swedish Riksbank (founded 1668),
the Bank of England (founded 1696) and the Prussian State Bank—to help
governments financially, especially to finance wars by granting credit, usually in
exchange for being provided with some kind of (perhaps local) monopoly to issue
banknotes or other privileges. But these banks unexpectedly and slowly developed
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into bankers’ banks because they were soon commanding the bulk of the nation’s
specie reserves, had the ability to provide extra cash and to discount commercial
bills. This leading position motivated them in several countries during the
nineteenth century to develop policies guaranteeing the convertibility of banknotes
into gold and to become lenders of last resort for other banks, especially in cases of
financial crises. Thus it is not surprising that following their examples more and
more central banks were founded and obtained the monopoly of issuing banknotes.
Thus the Deutsche Reichsbank was created in the aftermath of the crash of 1873,
and the US Federal Reserve System came into being as a consequence of the
discussion following the panic of 1907.
Though early central banks often enjoyed some independence from governments
and were even organized as private stock companies, they never enjoyed
independence in the modern sense before the breakdown of the gold standard
during World War I and the Great Depression. For to maintain price-stability before
these events independence was not necessary, since price stability was secured by
convertibility of banknotes and checking accounts at a fixed parity into gold which
by its natural scarcity limited the money supply. It follows that the emergence of
independent central banks as a pillar in the separation of powers required as one of
its preconditions the abolishment of convertibility.
Still, there are other preconditions for the emergence of central bank indepen-
dence. First, there must be present a bias towards inflation in the political system, a
question which will be discussed later. Second, the empirical evidence must show
that independent central banks lead to greater price stability than dependent ones.
Third, a fundamental problem arises because it is not obvious, why and under which
conditions inflation minded politicians are prepared and able to introduce
independence. Finally, another important question is whether central bank
independence can be maintained indefinitely or whether circumstances can arise
leading to its weakening or abolishment.
In the present paper I propose to discuss all these questions. But I will only take
up in passing how independence can and should be defined and whether
independent central banks have a better record in securing price stability. Both
questions have been discussed extensively, and sufficient empirical evidence for the
truth of the latter hypothesis has been provided to convince most monetary
economists (Cukierman et al. 1992; Eijffinger and de Haan 1996).
The following analysis of the introduction of independent central banks will,
however, have to be imbedded into a broader historical analysis examining under
which conditions it has been possible to introduce stable monetary regimes able to
guarantee price stability. The same approach will be taken when analyzing the
historical conditions in which stable monetary regimes have been eroded or even
been abolished.
The proposed approach discussing the independence of central banks as one of
the pillars of a separation of powers provides, moreover, an example for answering
the question, under which conditions, given the inherent tendencies of political
systems to extend the powers of leading politicians, the introduction of good
constitutions with separation of powers is possible and whether it can be maintained
under unfavorable circumstances.
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2 The dependence of price stability on the kind of existing monetary regime
The independence of central banks as a part of the separation of powers has been
developed with the main end to safeguard the stability of money against devaluation
or inflation. Historically this aim has been best served by the existence of metallic
currencies with full intrinsic silver or gold value of coins, as shown in Table 1.
Another example is provided by the introduction in the thirteenth century of the
guilder (fiorino d’oro) and the ducat as new gold coins by Florence and Venice,
respectively, that is of coins which remained stable for about three centuries. As will
be shown below this does, however, not mean that monetary systems based on
precious metals are not threatened by political incursions. As is well-known, even
such currencies have often suffered from debasement, that is the lowering of the
content of precious metals in coins, the reduction of their weight or the increase of
their nominal value. We will return to these problems later in the paper.
But even after the invention of bank or government paper notes (defined at that
time as money surrogates), the legal rule enforcing convertibility of these notes at a
fixed parity into silver or gold proved for long periods a sufficient safeguard for the
stable value of money. This was for instance the case during the period of the gold
standard (Fig. 1), which arose ‘‘naturally’’ first in Great Britain by the working of
Gresham’s Law around 1700. Other countries joined this system in the nineteenth
century by government decisions, usually by giving up silver standards.. As can be
seen, during the rule of the gold and silver standards until the outbreak of World
War I or after the restoration of gold standard during the Great Depression of the
1930 s no upward trend of the price level, but only long-term swings can be
observed. But after the demise of the convertibility of banknotes into gold at a fixed
parity and thus the introduction on a discretionary paper money standard the price
level rises dramatically even in the respective developed countries. These
consequences of the abolishment of the gold standard in favor of inconvertible
fiat paper money demonstrate clearly why constitutional or legal rules establishing
the independence of central banks were required to safeguard price stability given
this new monetary regime. For the experiences since this time demonstrate again
clearly the inflationary bias of rulers, politicians and states. That the independence
of central banks limits this bias is confirmed for recent decades by the evidence
presented in Fig. 2 and in Table 2. Until 1971–1974 the system of Bretton Woods
prevailed, with fixed exchange rates to and a convertibility of the dollar into gold at
Table 1 Weights of Athenian and Corinthian silver coins in grams
Athens
Year 575–525 525–500 525–500 460–450 393–300 167–166
Didrachm 8.429
Tetradrachm 16.949 16.94 17.14 17.19 16.89
Corinth
Year 570–550 515–500 525–500 460 430 320
Stater 8.55 8.61 8.66 8.67 8.59 8.61
Source Jenkins and Ku¨thmann (1972)
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a fixed parity for monetary authorities. But since the US Treasury and the Federal
Reserve System mostly neglected the consequences of gold convertibility, the rates
of inflation were internationally determined by the monetary policies of the latter,
except for some devaluations and revaluations of the exchange rates of several
currencies with the dollar. The devaluations were taken by the UK, France and Italy
which had dependent central banks, whereas the revaluations occurred in Germany
and Switzerland which enjoyed independent central banks (compare first line of
Table 2). But on the whole the average rates of inflation were more similar than
later for the countries depicted in Fig. 2 until the breakdown of the Bretton Woods
System in 1974. Since then Germany, Switzerland and the UK followed policies of
flexible exchange rates which made them independent in their monetary policies.
France and Italy for some years intermittently fixed their exchange rates to the
German mark, but because of their more expansive monetary policies they usually
had to leave this so-called snake or later the European Monetary System and
returned to flexible exchange rates. Whereas Germany, Switzerland and the USA
had independent central banks, this was not the case for Italy, France and the UK,
where the central banks were controlled by the Ministers of Finance or the
Treasuries. As a consequence the rates of inflation diverged widely among these six
countries from 1970 to 1985, as can be seen in the Figure and in Table 2. They
amounted to an annual average of 4.69% for Germany, 4.75 for Switzerland, 7.03
for the USA, 8.57 for France, 11.82 for the UK and 13.94 for Italy. This shows
clearly the better inflation performance of the countries with independent central
banks. These different developments went on in later years (Table 2), but from 1983
France maintained its exchange rate at a fixed level to the DM (Bernholz 1999,
pp. 762–765), and in 1998 the European Currency Area was created. And even the
UK established some weak form of independence for the Bank of England in the
1990s.
We have still to discuss what is meant by the independence of central banks or
the degree of it. ‘‘Central bank independence refers to the freedom of monetary
policymakers from direct political or governmental influence in the conduct of
policy’’ (Walsh 2008). Independence is secured if
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1. The central bank is legally independent. This is the case if the governor and the
policy-making directorate or board is elected for a long period (e.g. for eight
years) and cannot be dismissed except for criminal transgressions, and if the
bank is not allowed to take any instructions and orders from the government
(goal independence). In this sense the Bank of England is not fully independent
since the Treasury is entitled to prescribe annual inflation targets. Moreover, no
government officials have voting power on the governing board of the central
bank. On the other hand this independence does not preclude that aims like
‘‘price stability’’ and ‘‘the general condition of the economy or unemployment
as aims but subordinated to price stability’’ are stated in the laws guaranteeing
the independence. In the USA besides price stability ‘‘maximum employment’’
is mentioned as a second target in its charter.
2. The central bank is financially independent, that is it can finance its expenses
itself.
3. The central bank is independent in the application of its policy instruments
(instrument independence) which are, however, sometimes circumscribed in its
statutes.
Indexes measuring the degree of independence of central banks have been
constructed, of which the most widely employed is due to Cukierman et al. (1992).
For the purpose of this article it would be counterproductive to participate any
Table 2 Average annual rates of inflation
Period UK Germany France Switzerland Italy USA
1950–1975 5.82 3.05 5.75 3.42 4.93 3.23
1970–1985 11.82 4.69 8.57 4.75 13.94 7.03
1985–2000 3.99 2.01 2.21 2.13 4.22 3.18
2000–2010 2.09 1.14 1.65 0.89 2.19 2.39
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further in the extensive discussion about the independence of central banks and
whether this has indeed led to lower inflation (but see Walsh 2008, Cukierman
1992). From the above it should be obvious that the independence of the
Bundesbank and the Swiss National Bank has led to much lower inflation rates than
those experienced in the countries with dependent central banks considered. And
there is no doubt that these two central banks have been the most independent in the
world after World War 2. On the other hand, even central bankers directing
independent institutions are only human beings and thus not immune against
psychological and especially political influences. This shows itself in the fact that
even in countries with independent central banks there exists some long-term
inflationary tendency (Fig. 2) quite in contrast to the gold standard (Fig. 1).
In Figs. 1 and 2 only the historical experiences of developed and relatively stable
countries have been compared. The changes brought about by the introduction of
uncovered fiat money were much more dramatic in less stable countries hit by wars,
wrong economic policies or social unrests (Table 3). All of the thirty hyper-
inflations (with 50 % or more inflation per month) mentioned took place after the
breakdown of the gold standard with only one exception, namely France during the
Great Inflation of the 1790s, which, however, was also only made possible by the
introduction of a fiat paper money, the assignats.
It follows from our analysis that the most important differences between a
monetary regime based on precious metals and one based on fiat paper money are of
a technical and a legal nature. Given the fact that the amount of precious metals
cannot be increased at will there exist always binding budget constraints for the
Table 3 Hyperinflations in the twentieth century
Country Year(s) Highest inflation
per month
Country Year(s) Highest inflation
per month
Austria 1921/1922 124.27 Hungary 1945/1946 1.29500E ? 016
Argentina 1989/1990 196.6 Kyrgyzstan 1992 54.17a
Armenia 1993/1994 438.04 Moldova 1992 170.98a
Azerbaijan 1991/1994 118.09 Nicaragua 1986/1989 126.62
Belarus 1999 59.5a Peru 1989 104.14
Bolivia 1984/1986 120.39 Poland 1921/1924 187.54
Brazil 1989/1990 84.32 Poland 1989/1990 77.33
Bulgaria 1997 242.7 Serbia 1992/1994 309000000
China 1947/1949 4208.73 Soviet Union 1922/1924 278.72
Congo 1991/1993 124.3 Taiwan 1945/1949 398.73
(Zaire) Tajikistan 1995 78.1
Germany 1920/1923 29525.71 Turkmenistan 1993 62.5
Georgia 1993/1994 196.72 Ukraine 1991/1993 249
Greece 1942/1945 11288 Yugoslavia 1990 58.82
Hungary 1923/1924 82.18 Zimbabwe 2008b 79.6 9 1012
a Geometric average of quarter. Serbia with Montengro: New Yugoslav Republic
b Estimate Prog. Steven Hanke
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monetary authorities. This is no longer the case for fiat paper money. If the central
bank enjoys a note issuing monopoly it can technically create as many of the same
banknotes as it or the politically responsible people want. And a debasement of a
currency based on fixed amounts of precious metals always implies fraud, whereas
this is not the case if more of the same banknotes are issued. Moreover, debasement
is technically limited whereas this is not the case for banknote creation. It is thus not
surprising that the limits set to the first monetary regime by the scarcity of precious
metals has already been early observed by the Muslim medieval scholar Ibn
Khaldun, who saw this fact as part of a monetary constitution ordained by God:
There is another aspect to alchemy proving its impossibility. It concerns the
result of alchemy. This is as follows. It was God’s wise plan that gold and
silver, being rare, should be the standard of value by which the profits and
capital accumulation of human beings are measured. (Now,) if it were possible
to obtain (gold and silver) artificially, God’s wise plan would be foiled. Gold
and silver would exist in such large quantities that it would be no use to
acquire them.
Khaldun (1958, vol. 3, 277).
With the introduction of paper money and checking or giro accounts not covered
by 100 % reserves this situation changed fundamentally, as frankly admitted by
Mervyn King, former President of the Bank of England:
It is this structure, in which risky long-term assets are funded by short-term
deposits, that makes banks so hazardous. Yet many treat loans to banks as if
they were risk-less. In isolation this would be akin to a belief in alchemy –
risk-free deposits can never be supported by long-term risky investments in
isolation. To work, financial alchemy requires the implicit support of the tax
payer (p.9).
And eliminating fractional reserve banking explicitly recognizes that the
pretense that risk-free deposits can be supported by risky assets is alchemy
(p.17).
But changes in expectations [about the future] can create havoc with the
banking systems because it relies so heavily on transforming short-term debt
into long-term risky assets. For a society to base its financial system on
alchemy is a poor advertisement for its rationality.
(King 2010)
Following these remarks the listener may well ask himself whether the financing
of government deficits by central banks creating base money out of nothing is not
even worse than alchemy.
From the relationships discussed it seems obvious that in a fiat paper money
regime the freedom and rights of citizens have to be protected by a fourth pillar of
the separation of powers limiting the possibilities of politicians and governments to
create money at their discretion. But if this is true, some important problems arise:
First, under which conditions is it possible to introduce stable monetary systems
given the inflationary bias of politicians and governments? And second, since
constitutional and legal safeguards in this respect are probably less safely secured
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than the independence of the judiciary and the role of parliament, under which
circumstances is the independence of this pillar and thus monetary stability
threatened? These are the questions which will be analyzed in the following
sections.
3 The introduction of sound money
We have shown that politicians and governments are characterized by an
inflationary bias. This bias can be easily explained for democracies. Even if they
have the best intentions politicians have to be elected or to be reelected, and they are
faced by interest groups and voters who are only well-informed about their most
immediate concerns, namely their income and wages, the security of their
employment, and the costs of their major expenditures, especially for renting.
Given this situation politicians can win votes by planning their expenditures
accordingly: First by furthering special interests by concentrating expenditures on
them and spreading the implied burdens on the population. Second, they have to
care for a high level of employment, for low rents by rent-controls and by promising
sufficient public support for health care and old age pensions. But in time all these
promised expenditures would lead to increased taxes felt by the population. To
escape this danger for their popularity politicians prefer to increase government
debt. But unfortunately there exist also limits beyond which capital markets are
afraid that they might lose their investments. As a consequence governments finally
turn to the central bank for help in financing their deficits. This is usually the first
step towards inflation. Moreover, politicians may exert pressure on central banks to
be more expansive to help them to fight unemployment.
Now, given the inflationary bias of politicians and governments, how can there
ever be any chance to introduce and maintain sound monetary constitutions? In a
paper presented about 30 years ago (Bernholz 1987), I defined, based on historical
evidence, four categories of conditions under which lost monetary stability can be
restored:
1. After a very high inflation or hyperinflation (ten most successful cases,
Bernholz 2003, p. 167);
2. Restoration of a sound monetary constitution at the old (gold or silver) parity
following periods of war, during which convertibility has been abolished, if the
price level has not increased too much compared to that of the main trading
partners (nine cases, Bernholz 1987, p. 90);
3. The introduction or reintroduction of a sound monetary constitution at a lower
parity following moderate inflations (seven cases, Bernholz 1987, p. 92 f.);
4. The introduction of stable monetary systems occasioned by the examples of
better institutions in other countries.
To these four categories I would now like to add a fifth:
5. Historical accidents (Gresham’s Law).
Let me shortly sketch the reasons why these conditions have been favorable.
During a very high inflation or hyperinflation the inflating money is substituted in
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spite of drastic penalties and fines by gold or silver coins, or nowadays by stable
foreign money. As a consequence the base for the inflation tax is shrinking and the
monetary authority of the government threatened. Ordinary revenues expressed in
the inflating money are decreasing drastically. Thus the government has to stabilize
its monetary system by a successful currency reform. Otherwise it will completely
lose its monetary authority and finally even all its revenues. In fact, I can document
seven cases in which the inflating money was fully driven out by stable money after
currency reforms failed (Table 4). In these cases the government had to legalize the
stable foreign money, like recently in Zimbabwe, to receive any further tax
revenues. In this case high inflation led to the ‘‘natural’’ introduction of stable
money. I could define these events as a different category, but forego this option,
since high inflation has also been the cause of these developments.
Concerning the second category the population wants the return to normality
after the end of the war, and the politicians follow this wide-spread feeling if the
war-time inflation has not been too high as compared to the main trading partners.
If a higher but still moderate inflation has taken place during a war or because of
other reasons which is felt by the population as a burden a return to stability is
possible because of the following reasons. The inflation has led to currency
substitution and thus to an under-valuation of the inflating currency furthering
exports and decreasing imports. If the government, following the wishes of the
population, begins to fight the inflation by lowering the growth rate of the money
supply, this under-valuation tends to vanish and eventually to turn into an over-
valuation. This, however, is hurting the export industries and the people employed
by them. Thus resistance by the industries hit and the respective unions rises.
Table 4 Advanced inflations ending in total natural substitutions of bad by good money
Country Period Earlier currency reforms
that faileda
Kind of good money Source
Ming
China
1375–1448 Silver bullion, copper
coins (limited)
Bernholz (1997)
USA 1776–1781 March 1780: new dollar
bills 1:20
Specie and state paper
money
Phillipps
(1972, 170 sq)
Bezanson
(1951, 325 sq)
France 1789–1797 February 1796: mandats
terri-toriaux 1:30
Gold and silver specie Thiers (1840)
Peru 1875–1887 September 1880:b incas 1:8 Silver coins Garland
(1908, 58 sq)
Mexico 1913–1917 June 1916: infalsificable
currency 10:1
Gold and silver specie Banyai
(1976, 73 sq)
Kemmerer
(1940, 114–15)
Zimbabwe 2000–2008 US dollar and rand Steve Hanke,
e-mail, 2012
a By a currency reform is meant a real reform ending high inflation, not just a cutting off of zeros
b It is not clear whether a real currency reform was intended
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Consequently, finally a compromise is struck: A stable monetary regime (usually
with a fixed exchange rate) is introduced but at an exchange rate which is still
somewhat undervalued. Thus the forces favoring some inflation are harnessed for
the purpose of the introduction of a stable monetary regime.
In the fourth case the citizens of countries with inflating currencies observe the
better situation in stable countries. Thus the politicians may introduce a stable
monetary constitution to win the votes of the population concerned about inflation.
The pressure exerted by foreign creditors supported by their governments may also
help to take this decision.
The last case is well documented by the emergence of the gold standard in
England around 1700.
At that time the gold supply increased in such a way that its value tended to fall
compared to silver. As a consequence of this and fixed nominal relations between
the values of gold and silver coins Gresham’s Law began to work. The Master of the
Mint, Isaac Newton, warned the authorities because of this development and asked
for a change of the official exchange rate between gold and silver coins. Finally
Parliament decided to introduce such a change. But it turned out that the lowering of
the official exchange rate of gold with silver was insufficient. So the gold drove out
the silver and a pure gold standard resulted. This standard proved to be a stable
monetary regime for more than two centuries.
4 Reasons for the maintenance of stable monetary regimes
In the course of monetary history sound monetary regimes were for the longest time
characterized by metallic currencies. But they, too, were often threatened by the
inflationary bias of rulers and politicians who misused the government monopoly for
issuing coins by lowering the content of precious metals like gold or silver in coins of
equal weight, by reducing the latter or by increasing the nominal value of them. As the
Belgian Historian Pirenne (1951) stated, when looking at European Medieval times
The progress of monetary circulation provided princes with the possibility to
use it to their own advantage. Possessing the right to mint coins, they believed
themselves to be authorized to use this in the interest of their treasury to the
detriment of the public. The more money became indispensable for economic
life, the more it was changed by those who had the right to strike it.… At the
end of the twelfth century, the monetary disorder had reached a point that a
reform imposed itself (pp. 258, 256).
A monetary constitution trying to prevent such debasements could either be
based on rules forbidding and sanctioning them, or on the own interest of rulers to
preserve stable values. England provides an interesting example for the former. In
the late Middle Ages the Parliament agreed to allow an increase of taxes in
exchange for a guarantee by the King to stop the manipulation of the currency.
However, the second reason has been more important in keeping metallic
currencies stable during the course of history (Table 1). Thus we have to ask
ourselves about the factors causing popular assemblies like in Athens and Corinth or
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the rulers of Venice and Florence not to touch the value of their currencies for
centuries. It seems that two factors were especially important: First the fact that the
respective currencies were circulating internationally. As a consequence the small
seignorage from minting the individual coins led to a government revenue greater
than the possible gain from debasing the currency because of the great number of
coins circulating. Second, it is interesting to note that many of the countries issuing
stable money were small with a flourishing economy strongly dependent on a high
percentage of exports and imports. In such small countries a debasement of the
currency would have hindered or lowered international trade and thus led to a loss of
wealth for influential merchants and the whole population.
5 The erosion and abolishment of stable monetary regimes
Souvera¨n ist, wer u¨ber den Ausnahmezustand entscheidet.
Sovereign is he who decides on emergencies.
Carl Schmitt 1993 [1922], p. 13)
All persons are hereby required to deliver on or before May 1, 1933, to a
Federal Reserve Bank or branch or agency thereof or to any member bank of
the Federal Reserve System all gold coin, gold bullion, and gold
Pronouncement by President Franklin D. Roosevelt on April 5, 1933:
After a long period of monetary stability it is difficult to erode or to abolish a stable
regime because the population has accustomed itself to and enjoys stable prices. As a
consequence a crisis, an emergency has to occur in most cases to enable politicians
able and willing to remove or to weaken the stable monetary constitution. In Table 5
quite a number of such events are listed. The list is incomplete since it is about
impossible to find all the other unknown similar events in history. One additional case
is Peru suffering from the events around the Andean War (Table 4). These emergency
events are similar to those which led to the debasement of currencies in former times,
but the degree and way in which stability has been removed are quite different. When
only coins or bars of precious metal were used as money the stability of the currency
could only be eroded by debasement. Already with the introduction of paper money
and of checking accounts still convertible into metallic money this situation changed
fundamentally. For now, given a government monopoly for issuing paper notes, the
limits presented by the scarcity of the underlying precious metal could easily be
removed by a law or decree abolishing convertibility and declaring government
banknotes to be the sole legal tender. But even when banknotes were still only issued
by private banks, which was the case before central banks with monopoly power were
established, the government could remove convertibility. This was done by the
Peruvian government in favor of the private banks in exchange for a huge credit they
had to lend it in the 1870 s. Similarly, already decades earlier the British government
abolished convertibility of the notes of the Bank of England in exchange for credits
granted to it by this institution in 1798.
It is interesting that the Hungarian economist Janos Kornai showed in the 1970s
that one of the weaknesses of the so-called planned economies was that neither
210 P. Bernholz
123
businesses nor other organizations faced binding budget constraints. Today this is
exactly the case for central banks lacking any requirement to redeem their
banknotes at a fixed parity in terms of scarce real assets, like formerly gold, silver or
even copper. Given this situation, it is not surprising that politicians under the
pressure of self-inflicted deficits and debts are tempted to take control of central
banks to further remove the binding budget constraints of the government.
These dangers have been clearly seen by leading economists like Wagner (1868,
pp. 46–48) and Jevons (1900, pp. 229–223) in the ninetieth century during the
heydays of the gold standard:
Experience with paper until today proves at least that it is possible ….to give
value to a paper money, which cannot be exchanged at any time [at a fixed
parity] at will into another currency. ….The obstacle … for maintaining an
equal purchasing power …is the impossibility to fulfill viable guarantees to
prevent that paper money would ever be used for financial purposes to create
artificial purchasing power for the issuing agency without labor out of nothing;
and to secure that it would be increased only according to the true necessity of
the economy. ….Men would first have to be capable of unlimited self-
discipline to resist any temptation to increase money arbitrarily, even if their
very existence, or that of the state, were at stake. … A somewhat greater
Table 5 Emergencies leading to an erosion of stable monetary regimes (incomplete)
Country Period Cause Kind of erosion
European
countries
1790–1817 French revolution
Napoleonic wars
Abolishment of silver or gold
convertibility
Austria
(-Hungary),
and Russia
Several times in
ninetieth
century
Wars leading to over-
indebtedness
Abolishment of silver convertibility
Italy 1866 War with Austria Abolishment of silver and gold
convertibility
Greece 1886 Government bankruptcy Abolishment of gold convertibility
Argentina 1890 Government bankruptcy Abolishment of gold convertibility
European 1914 World war I Abolishment of countries gold
convertibility
Most Countries 1931–1936 Great depression Abolishment of gold convertibility
USA 1933 Great depression Devaluation of dollar against gold,
prohibition to own gold
UK, F, It 1958–1973 Deficits of Balance of
payments, too expansive
policies
Devaluations of pound, franc and
lira in Bretton woods system
USA, World
Wide,
1971–1973 Too expansive US
monetary
End of Bretton and fiscal policies
woods system with fixed exchange
rates
Japan Since about
1990
Financial and growth crisis Erosion of independence of bank of
Japan
USA, UK, Euro
Area, Japan
Since 2008 Financial and government
debt crises
Erosion of independence of central
banks
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security against the abuse of the right to issue money might perhaps be
provided by one or the other constitutional form. But this certainly does not
amount to a big difference.
Wagner (1868, pp. 46–48).
The solution to the problem stated by Wagner has been found by the creation of
legally or even constitutionally independent central banks. And indeed, such
safeguards have led, as we have seen, to lower rates of inflation for countries with
independent central banks like Switzerland, Germany and the USA. As a
consequence this independence was at least partly imitated by several countries
since the 1980 s. Let me only mention the UK, Australia, Canada and the European
Currency Union as examples. Other countries like Bulgaria, Estonia and Lithuania
took even one step further and introduced Currency Boards. A currency board is
only entitled to issue banknotes in the same amount as it receives foreign exchange
reserves of a stable foreign currency at a legally fixed exchange rate, for instance
especially the US dollar and the DM (now changed into the euro). But as recent
developments since the outbreak of the financial and government debt crisis since
2008 show, the independence of several of these central banks is now threatened by
the measures taken by the respective governments because of the emergency. This
is, however, not a new experience as the examples given in Table 5 demonstrate
which are not limited to independent central banks. Wagner’s skeptical attitude
expressed in the last sentence of the quote is certainly not without justification.
During the last crisis European politicians have not hesitated to declare an
emergency with the purpose to violate article 125 of the Lisbon Teaty forbidding the
bail-out by other members of member states of the currency union which had over-
indebted themselves. And the European Central Bank (ECB) has bought and
promised to buy bonds of over-indebted member states though the monetization of
government debt is forbidden by article 123. Politicians like Chancellor Angela
Merkel asserted that not only the euro but also the whole EU were endangered
without these illegal measures and that no other alternative existed. This amounts to
a more than doubtful statement, since an open bankruptcy of Greece in the very
beginning, and later of Portugal and perhaps of some Irish and Spanish banks would
probably have been a less expensive alternative.
And it is not only the independence of the ECB, but also that of the Bank of
England and of the Fed which are threatened by the demands of governments
supported by the central banks themselves. And in Japan the Bank of Japan has given
in to the demands of the new Abe administration in January 2013 to become even
more expansive and to buy additional government bonds in a situation in which
already more than 50 % of government expenditures are financed by taking up credit.
6 Conclusions
It has been shown with the help of historical evidence, that politicians, rulers and
governments are characterized by a bias in favor of inflation. This bias has led the
more to detrimental inflations and their obnoxious negative consequences for the
real economy the less the hands of politicians and rulers were bound against
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misusing their influence on monetary regimes. With the development of paper
money, checking accounts and electronic money these dangers have reached huge
proportions as soon as convertibility into scarce real assets like gold or silver at a
fixed parity has been abolished. However, during the last decades the development
of a constitutional or legal independence of central banks creating a fourth pillar of
the separation of powers has limited these dangers. But historical evidence
demonstrates that this independence is threatened in cases of emergencies even
more than formerly the convertibility of notes into gold or silver and the
preservation of the full value of coins.
On the other hand, it has been shown that long periods of stable monetary
regimes did occur, sometimes even lasting for centuries. A last historical example
has been the gold standard. And finally, the granting of independence to central
banks as a new pillar of the separation of powers has brought at least 50 years of
relative monetary stability to some countries during the last century.
Given our results it should be an important task for monetary economists, public
choice theorists and legal scholars to develop monetary regimes less liable to fall
prey to inflation-biased pressures especially during emergencies. For capital market
participants and governments one of the most important tasks amounts to preventing
such emergencies by creating adequate codes of conduct and regulations, and by
preventing major wars.
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